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Conservation of Endangered Species: Can Incentives Work 




It has been argued that the traditional regulatory approach of the Endangered Species Act, 
based on land-use restrictions, has failed to protect endangered species on private land. In 
response, there has been a call for the use of incentives to complement this regulatory 
approach. This paper examines the potential of incentives programs to elicit conservation-
oriented management choices from landowners. Data obtained from a survey of non-
industrial private forest owners in Oregon and Washington is used to examine the 
effectiveness of various incentives. The results indicate that incentives, in particular 
compensation and assurances, can be effective in increasing the conservation effort 
provided by landowners. The results also suggest that conservation policy for private lands 
could be improved by relying on a combination of incentives, including financial incentives 
and assurances, rather than exclusively on the threat of regulation.                1




The conservation of endangered species on private land remains a controversial 
topic. Section 9 of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) prohibits any private action that may 
directly result in the taking of endangered species. Additionally, as interpreted by the U.S. 
Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), it restricts any activity that may indirectly harm a species 
by modifying its habitat in ways that hinder essential activities, such as feeding and 
breeding
1. These restrictions can encompass otherwise lawful activities such as logging, 
construction, or grazing, and thus have raised vigorous opposition from property rights 
advocates. As a result, enforcement of Section 9 has become increasingly difficult. This 
could severely undermine endangered species recovery efforts under the ESA, because 
more than half of the listed endangered species have at least 80% of their habitat on private 
land (FWS 1997a).  
Furthermore, it has been widely maintained that a common reaction by landowners 
to the prospect of these restrictions is to “shoot, shovel, and shut up”. That is, the traditional 
approach to regulation may generate perverse incentives that compel landowners to manage 
their land in ways that discourage the presence of endangered species, in order to avoid 
land-use restrictions. This argument has been made formally by Polasky and Doremus 
(1998), Innes (2000), and Polasky (2001), and anecdotal evidence of such behavior 
abounds (see, e.g., Mann and Plummer 1995, Bean and Wilcove 1997, Bean 1998). 
                                                 
1 This interpretation was upheld by the Supreme Court in Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for 
a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687 (1995).                 2
Michael and Lueck (2000) have found empirical evidence of this behavior in the case of 
private forest owners in the southeast and the red-cockaded woodpecker.  
Another potential drawback of Section 9 of the ESA is that it is “all sticks and no 
carrots”, since its goal is to prevent harmful conduct by landowners rather than encourage 
desirable behavior. For many endangered species, benign neglect might be insufficient to 
bring about recovery, as they require active management of their habitat (Bean and Wilcove 
1996, Bean 1998). This can give rise to costs that even well-meaning landowners might not 
be willing to undertake. Additionally, there are opportunity costs of forgone revenue from 
the most profitable use of the property. 
Thus, Section 9 of the ESA seems to grant inadequate protection to endangered 
species on private land, and may even cause the very behavior it attempts to prevent. 
Hence, there has been a call for the use of incentives-based voluntary programs to 
complement the existing regulatory framework. Two main approaches have been 
suggested. The first one is based on agreements that provide landowners with assurances 
regarding future regulation, such as “no surprises” Habitat Conservation Plans or Safe 
Harbor Agreements (Wilcove et al. 1996, Bean and Wilcove 1996). The second approach is 
based on offering the landowner incentives to manage his land in a way that is compatible 
with the survival and recovery of endangered species. These incentives include, for 
example, compensation payments, tax credits, cost sharing agreements, public recognition, 
and stewardship certification (see, e.g., Keystone Center 1995 or Vickerman 1998).  
Much of the existing literature on incentives for conservation has focused on their 
application on farmland. For instance, McLean-Meyinsse et al. (1994) examine small 
farmers’ willingness to participate in the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), and 
Cooper and Osborn (1998) analyze re-enrollment in the CRP as a function of the rental rate                 3
paid. Smith (1995) uses mechanism design theory to characterize the properties of a least-
cost CRP, and Wu and Babcock (1996) derive optimal payment schedules for an 
environmental stewardship program. 
  The use of incentives has been examined in the case of private forest owners as 
well. Boyd (1984) evaluates the impact of cost-sharing and forester assistance on non-
industrial timber supply. Royer (1987) shows that the reforestation decisions of landowners 
are responsive to cost-sharing assistance. Hardie and Parks (1996) analyze how cost sharing 
could have affected investment in pine regeneration between 1971 and 1981. Kluender et 
al. (1999) find that landowners who manage their forest for timber would engage in 
forestry practices regardless of assistance payments.    
There is also a growing literature that specifically addresses the use of incentives to 
promote management that benefits endangered species (see, e.g., Smith and Shogren 2001, 
2002, Defenders of Wildlife 1994, Stone 1995, Kennedy et al. 1996, Bourland and Stroup 
1996). However, there have been relatively few formal empirical analyses of the effect of 
incentives on private landowners’ decisions. Kline et al. (2000) examine the willingness of 
non-industrial private forest owners (NIPFs) to forego harvesting to improve habitat for 
endangered salmon. Zhang and Flick (2001) measure the impact of both the ESA and cost-
share and tax incentives on the reforestation investment behavior of NIPFs.   
This paper adds to this literature by analyzing the likely effects of assurances, cost 
sharing, and compensation incentives on landowners’ management decisions in the specific 
context of endangered species conservation. I used data from a survey of NIPFs in Oregon 
and Washington to construct econometric models that measure the probable effect of these 
incentives on landowners’ willingness to provide conservation effort. This allowed me to 
assess the potential of these incentives as a policy tool for managing endangered species on                 4
private land. Additionally, the estimates from the econometric models were used to 
examine the effectiveness of different incentive program designs.   
The results obtained provide evidence that conservation policy for protecting 
endangered species on private land could be improved by offering “carrots” to landowners 
to complement the existing regulatory “sticks”. Specifically, the analysis indicates that 
compensation and assurances could have a significant effect on landowner’s management 
decisions, but cost sharing may not. Furthermore, the results suggest that policy makers can 
design more effective incentives programs by combining financial incentives with 
assurances about future regulation. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. First, I present an analytical 
framework to motivate the econometric analysis, followed by a description of the data and 
the survey instrument used to obtain it. After that, I present the econometric model and the 
empirical results. Then, a simulation is conducted to analyze the implications of the 
empirical results for the design of incentives programs. Finally, I discuss the main findings 
and conclude.  
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
In this section, I assume that a landowner has voluntarily agreed to participate in a 
conservation agreement, and I use a simple model to examine how different incentives can 
affect the amount of conservation effort the landowner is willing to supply. This analysis 
will provide a basis for the development of the survey instrument and the empirical models 
that follow.  
Following Langpap and Wu (2002), I use a two period model of the interaction 
between a landowner and a regulator, in which the first period represents the present and 
the second period represents the entire future time horizon. Suppose that at the beginning of                 5
period 1 a regulator, such as the FWS, approaches a landowner and proposes that he 
voluntarily participate in a conservation agreement and supply conservation effort levels cv1 
and cv2 for periods 1 and 2, respectively. To fix ideas, suppose that cv1 and cv2 represent a 
specific management plan for the property.  
At the beginning of period 2 the regulator may learn that a change in the 
management plan is necessary (for instance, new knowledge about a species may become 
available, or an unforeseeable event may alter the status of a species), and thus he may 
require that the management plan for period 2 be 
*
2 c  > cv2. This occurs with probability q.
2 
Although the required changes are not known until the second period, in period 1 the 
landowner forms an expectation about the alternative management plan, denoted by E
*
2 c .  
In exchange for participating and supplying conservation effort, the landowner is 
offered one or more of three incentives: cost sharing on out-of-pocket costs of 
implementing the management plan, assurances that no additional conservation effort will 
be required in period 2 (i.e. that the management plan in period 2 will be cv2, as originally 
agreed, rather than 
*
2 c ), and compensation for opportunity costs of implementing the 
management plan.  
The landowner may reject the proposition. If he does, he faces the possibility that, 
with probability p, the regulator will impose mandatory conservation levels 
*
1 m c  and E
*
2 m c , 
which could represent restrictions on harvesting or development on the property
3. If no 
                                                 
2 The probability q characterizes the regulator’s a priori unknown willingness or ability to require more 
conservation. For instance, the regulator may be unwilling or unable to modify an existing management plan 
for political reasons or due to lack of funding for additional research and enforcement expenses.  
3 Regulation is uncertain because the regulator may be unable or unwilling to enforce the law due to 
information requirements, high burden of proof, or political considerations (Polasky and Doremus 1998).                 6
mandatory conservation is imposed, the landowner develops his property, and thus does not 
supply any conservation effort.  
Let ai and bi be the unit out-of-pocket and opportunity costs of conservation, 
respectively, for i = v, m. Out-of-pocket costs include, for example, labor and machinery 
costs of thinning a stand of forest. Opportunity costs include, for example, the revenue 
forgone when a stand of forest is not harvested. Additionally, let γ be the fraction of out-of-
pocket costs incurred by the landowner under a cost-sharing incentive. Similarly, let α be 
the portion of opportunity costs incurred by the landowner under a compensation incentive. 
I assume that the costs of conservation are linear, and that it is cheaper to provide a given 
conservation effort under a voluntary agreement than under a mandatory agreement, i.e. av 
+ bv < am + bm.  The reasoning behind this assumption is that a voluntary agreement 
provides more flexibility for the landowner to choose the most cost-effective way to 
provide any given level of conservation effort. The landowner will accept the regulator’s 
proposition and implement management plan (cv1, cv2) if and only if  
(γav+αbv)cv1+q(γav+αbv)E
*
2 c  +(1 – q)(γav+αbv)cv2 ≤ p(am+bm)(
*
1 m c+  E
*
2 m c )   (1) 
The cost sharing, compensation, and assurances incentives are thus given by γ < 1, α < 1, 
and q = 0, respectively. Decision rule (1) can be rearranged to define the landowner’s 
acceptance set 









1 m c + E
*
2 m c ) – qE
*
2 c  }   (2) 
This set can be interpreted as containing all the management plans that the landowner will 
accept as part of a conservation agreement. The set SL is shown in Figure 1.                  7
Suppose that the regulator and the landowner reach an agreement, under which the 
landowner will provide the maximum conservation effort he is willing to supply
4. That is, 
condition (1) holds with equality. This means that the management plan (cv1, cv2) is on the 
upper boundary of the set SL in Figure 1. If this management plan does not coincide with 
the regulator’s first choice of conservation effort (for instance, that which maximizes net 
social benefits from conservation, as in Langpap and Wu 2002), the regulator may try to 
elicit higher conservation effort by using cost sharing, compensation, and assurances 
incentives. To understand the potential effect of these incentives, I examine how changes in 
the incentive parameters γ, α, and q affect decision rule (1) and the acceptance set SL. 
Starting from a base scenario in which no incentives are offered, i.e. γ = α = 1 and q > 0, the 
regulator can increase the level of conservation effort by setting γ' < 1 and α' < 1 and by 
offering assurances, which sets q = 0. Thus, decision rule (1) becomes 
(γ'av + α'bv)cv1 + (γ'av + α'bv)cv2 ≤ p(am + bm)( 
*
1 m c+  E
*
2 m c )            (3) 
and the acceptance set is  









1 m c + E
*
2 m c )}    (4) 
By comparing conditions (1) and (3), and sets (2) and (4), it is clear that cost sharing and 
compensation (γ' < γ, α' < α) can increase the conservation effort provided by the landowner 
by decreasing the cost of conservation. Additionally, Langpap and Wu (2002) show that 
offering assurances can increase the conservation effort supplied by the landowner when 
additional conservation is expected in the second period. The effect of these incentives is 
shown in Figure 2. The management plan with cost sharing, compensation, and assurances 
                                                 
4 Langpap and Wu (2002) discuss the necessary and sufficient conditions for such an agreement. The 
landowner participates because of the cost advantage offered by voluntary agreements (as long as the 
expected future conservation requirements are not too large).                 8
incentives is on the upper boundary of the set SL' (the solid line), which is above that of the 
set SL
 (the dashed line), corresponding to the case of no incentives. This indicates that a 
higher level of conservation effort is supplied when incentives are offered.  
There are other factors, not considered explicitly in this simple model, which can 
affect the landowner’s response to these incentives. For instance, the availability of 
technical assistance may lower the cost of conservation for some landowners. The 
opportunity cost of conservation may depend on characteristics of the landowner’s 
property, such as size, or, in the case of a forest, the age of the trees. Additionally, 
landowners may derive utility from conservation, which could affect the opportunity cost. 
This utility, and therefore the opportunity cost, can depend on the landowner’s original 
management plan for the property, as well as demographic characteristics such as age, 
occupation, or income. Furthermore, the landowner’s perceived threat of regulation can 
affect the parameter p in the model, and thereby have an effect on the response to the 
incentives. Finally, other factors, such as the availability of technical assistance, could 
affect the cost of conservation as well.  
In the following sections, I examine empirically whether cost sharing, 
compensation, and assurances can have an effect on the management plan that a landowner 
is willing to implement, as the results from this simple model suggest. The role played by 
other factors, such as landowner and property characteristics, will be analyzed as well.  
SURVEY AND DATA  
Survey 
  A survey instrument was designed to examine how landowners’ management 
decisions would respond to cost sharing, compensation, and assurances incentives. The 
study area included 25 counties in western Oregon and Washington. The names and                 9
addresses of all NIPFs who owned at least 10 acres of land zoned as forest
5 were obtained 
from county tax assessor offices. A mail survey was designed and conducted according to 
the Total Design Method (Dillman 1978) in the summer and fall of 2001. A first version of 
the survey was pre-tested with two focus groups of NIPFs. A second version of the survey 
was mailed out to a subset of the sample as a further pretest. The final version of the survey 
was mailed out to 1,500 NIPFs, followed by a reminder postcard, and second and third 
mailings to non-respondents. Of the original 1,500 mailings, 101 surveys were 
undeliverable, so the final sample consisted of 1,399 forest owners. Seven hundred and 
thirty seven of the returned surveys were usable, which yields a response rate of 53% (or 
49% of the entire sample of 1,500). Finally, a sample of 137 non-respondents (30% of total 
non-responses) were contacted by phone and asked for information on characteristics that 
could influence response
6. This information was used to conduct a test for sample-selection 
bias, which is described below.  
  As in the analytical model, survey recipients were asked if they would be willing to 
participate in a conservation agreement, and presented with a choice of three hypothetical 
“incentives programs”. Respondents who answered that they would not be willing to 
participate, regardless of the incentives offered, were excluded from the sample. Each 
program contained a management plan and some combination of the various incentives, as 
well as a technical assistance attribute. Landowners also had the option not to accept any of 
the incentives programs offered (see the Appendix for an example). This choice was 
                                                 
5 Ten acres was chosen as a cutoff point because the distribution of landowners showed that there are 
relatively large numbers of landowners with small properties (up to 10 acres) and comparatively few owners 
with larger properties. Thus, a random sample that included all acreages would have resulted in larger 
landowners, who own most of the acreage, being underrepresented.  Additionally, smaller holdings are more 
likely to be held as rural-residential properties, and not as forestland. 
6 Specifically, I obtained information on importance given to services provided by the landowner’s forest, 
total acres owned, years they have owned the property, knowledge of incentives programs, perceived 
likelihood of regulation, age, occupation, and income.                  10
presented three times to each survey recipient, and the composition of the incentives 
programs was varied across different versions of the survey. This setup makes it possible to 
observe how the landowners’ willingness to implement different management plans varies 
as the levels of the various incentives change, and thus to measure the effect of these 
incentives on the level of conservation effort supplied.  Additionally, to take into account 
other factors that may influence the landowner’s response to the incentives, the survey 
included questions on characteristics of their land, their perceived risk of regulation under 
the ESA, and demographic information.  
Data 
The three management plans presented to landowners in the survey consisted of one 
or more of three silvicultural techniques: thinning, providing snags and downed logs, and 
managing under story vegetation. Implementation of these techniques may speed the 
development of forest structures required by endangered species commonly associated with 
the Pacific Northwest, such as spotted owl, marbled murrelet, and salmon (FWS 1992, 
1997b, USDA 1993, Hayes et al. 1997). Plan 1 consists only of thinning, Plan 2 includes 
thinning and providing snags and logs, and Plan 3 consists of thinning, providing snags and 
logs, and managing under story vegetation. A key feature of these management plans is that 
they are progressively more complex, and hence increasingly beneficial to the species and 
costly to the landowner as well. These management plans are a proxy for the landowner’s 
readiness to supply conservation effort. The increasing complexity provides a sense of 
ordering that makes it possible to measure whether incentives can elicit higher conservation 
effort. The resulting measure is the dependent variable in the model, PLAN = 0, 1, 2, or 3, 
where PLAN = 0 represents no conservation effort.                  11
The main independent variables (SHARE, COMP, ASSURE) measure the levels of 
cost sharing, compensation, and assurances incentives offered. To account for the 
possibility that the effectiveness of these incentives may vary with income levels, 
opportunity costs, and the perceived probability of regulation, the incentive regressors were 
allowed to interact with these variables. Additionally, a landowner’s choice of management 
plan may depend on the availability of technical assistance. Thus, the model includes a 
variable that indicates whether assistance is available or not (ASSIST). 
  The survey asked landowners how likely they believed it was that the ESA might 
restrict timber harvesting, development, or other activities on their land. The variable 
REGULATE is the likelihood of regulation given by the landowner on a 5-point scale, 
ranging from “Very Unlikely” to “Very Likely”. The model also includes a number of 
demographic and land-characteristic variables that may have an effect on the cost of 
conservation. Finally, landowners were asked to consider a specific stand on their property 
where they might be willing to implement a management plan, and to provide information 
about this stand. The size and age of this stand (STANDSIZE, STANDAGE) are included 
to control for opportunity costs of participating in the incentives program. In addition, I 
control for alternative uses of the stand by including two dummy variables that describe the 
landowner’s harvesting plans. A description of all these variables, along with summary 




                                                 
7 Earlier versions of the model explored the role of variables measuring the importance given by the 
landowner to various services provided by his forest, variables describing the landowner’s knowledge of and 
experience with incentives programs, and variables controlling for membership in forestry and conservation 
organizations. None of these had a significant effect on management decisions, so they were left out of the 
models presented here.                   12
ECONOMETRIC MODELS AND RESULTS 
Given the ordered nature of the dependent variable, the model used for estimation is 
an ordered probit. Likelihood ratio tests revealed that some of the regressors (SHARE, 
ASSURE, ASSIST, SHXIN, ASXRE, STANDSIZ, HARV40) were heteroscedastic. To 
accommodate this, I used a general multiplicative formulation for the variance of the 
disturbances (Greene 2000): Var[ε] = [exp(ν'z)]
2, where z is the vector of heteroscedastic 
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where xi is a vector containing the regressors described in the preceding section (incentives, 
landowner and property characteristics), µ1 and µ2 are threshold parameters to be estimated 
along with β, and Φ(•) is the cumulative density function for the standard normal 
distribution. Table 2 shows the maximum likelihood estimates for two versions of this 
model (corrected for heteroscedasticity).  
  In model 1, the null hypothesis that the parameter estimates for age, education, 
occupation, and the variables for property characteristics are all equal to zero could not be 
rejected (the p-value for the Wald test is 0.91), so these variables are left out of model 2. 
The income dummies are not significant independently, but the null hypothesis that they are 
jointly equal to zero can be rejected (p = 0.096). The chi-squared statistics for overall fit 
and the scaled R
2 statistics indicate that the models have good explanatory power. 
Sample Selection Bias 
  Models 1 and 2 were also tested for potential sample selection bias induced by 
survey non-response, a common problem with mail-administered surveys (Mitchell and                 13
Carson 1989, Messonier et al. 2000). If non-response occurs in such a way that the factors 
that determine a landowner’s choice of management plan and those that determine response 
are correlated, then the parameters estimated in the preceding models may be biased. The 
information obtained in the follow-up phone survey of non-respondents was used to 
conduct a two-step Heckman test for sample selection bias (Heckman 1979, Edwards and 
Anderson 1987, Mesonnier et al. 2000). The first step consists of a probit model of 
participation in the survey. The resulting parameter estimates are used to calculate the 
inverse Mills ratio (λ1), which represents the probability of a recipient having responded 
(i.e. being in the sample). The inverse Mills ratio is then included as an additional regressor 
in Models 1 and 2 in the second part of the procedure. The test for sample selection bias is 
based on a t-test of the significance of the parameter estimate for λ1. If it is not statistically 
significant, then the null hypothesis of no sample selection bias cannot be rejected. The 
results of this test for models 1 and 2 show that there is no evidence of sample selection 
bias: the t-statistics for λ1 are -0.43, and –0.24, respectively.  
  An additional selection bias test is necessary because those survey respondents who 
answered that they would not participate in a conservation agreement regardless of the 
incentives offered were excluded from the sample. The two-step Heckman test is repeated, 
using a probit model of participation in the conservation agreement based on demographic 
and property characteristics of survey respondents. Once again, the results of the test show 
no evidence of selection bias: the t-statistics for λ2 (the second inverse Mills ratio) are 0.28, 
and – 0.42 for models 1 and 2, respectively. 
Results 
The results presented in Table 2, which are consistent across both models (and 
others which are not reported), show that the coefficients of COMP and ASSURE are                 14
significantly different from zero, suggesting that compensation and assurances incentives 
would have an effect on the probability that landowners supply conservation effort.  The 
coefficient of SHARE is not significantly different from zero, but that of the interaction 
variable for cost sharing and income (SHXIN) is. This suggests that the effect of cost 
sharing depends on the level of income. Additionally, the coefficient of HARV40 is 
significant, suggesting that landowners who plan to harvest in 40 or more years are more 
likely to manage the stand for endangered species than those who have medium- or short-
term harvesting plans. It is also interesting to note that the coefficients of ASSIST and 
REGULATE are not significant, suggesting that technical assistance and the perceived 
likelihood of regulation may not affect the landowners’ management decisions. These 
results are discussed further in section VI. 
To understand the effects of the significant incentive variables (COMP and 
ASSURE) on the dependent variable, marginal effects were computed as follows. For a 
discrete variable that appears in x and z, say xk, define xks and xkf as the starting and final 
values of xk, respectively. Additionally, define  k x−  as the vector of all regressors, except xk, 
evaluated at their sample mean. Similarly, define k z−  as the vector of heteroscedastic 
variables, except xk, evaluated at their sample mean.  Then 
Pr(PLAN = i|xkj) = Ф[(µi-βkxkj – β-k' k x− )/exp(νkxkj + ν-k' k z− )] –  
           Ф[(µi-1- βkxkj – β-k' k x− )/exp(νkxkj+ν-k' k z− )],   j = s, f. 
 
The marginal effect of xk is ∆Pr(PLAN = i) = Pr(PLAN = i|xkf) - Pr(PLAN = i|xks)  
for i = 0, 1, 2, 3 (Long 1997). Table 3 gives the signs of these marginal effects, and Figure 
3 shows the probabilities in that each plan is chosen for the different values of the 
compensation and assurances incentives. The marginal effects for the compensation and                 15
assurances incentives suggest that increasing the level of compensation and providing 
assurances decrease the probability of no effort and a small amount of effort (PLAN=0 and 
PLAN =1) and increase the probability of higher levels of conservation effort (PLAN = 2 
and PLAN = 3). 
  These results indicate that incentives could be used effectively to increase the level 
of conservation effort supplied by private landowners. They also suggest that some 
incentives may be more effective than others. For instance, in the particular scenario 
examined here, compensation and assurances would have a more significant effect than 
cost sharing. This raises the question of how to optimally design incentives programs by 
combining different incentives to achieve the largest effect on landowners’ management 
decisions.  
DESIGN OF INCENTIVES PROGRAMS  
The parameters and marginal effects estimated in the preceding section are based on 
the incentives programs presented to landowners in the survey, which included different 
combinations of cost sharing, compensation, and assurances incentives. Designing 
conservation policy based on incentives may involve having to choose only one type of 
incentive (for instance, Habitat Conservation Plans, which provide assurances to 
landowners, generally do not offer financial incentives as well), or finding the most 
effective mix of incentives. Thus, it is useful to examine how a representative landowner’s 
willingness to provide conservation effort changes for different combinations of incentives.  
I conduct a simulation of the probabilities that each plan is implemented given 
different combinations of incentives, keeping all the other variables constant at their sample 
mean. To show the effects of the different incentives clearly, I assume they are applied at 
the highest possible level (75% for cost sharing and 100% for compensation). Additionally,                 16
I assume that no technical assistance is offered (there is no qualitative change in the results 
if assistance is included).  
  Table 4 shows the simulated probabilities that each plan is chosen. The base 
scenario is one in which no incentives are offered. In this case, it is most likely that the 
landowner would supply no conservation effort or low effort: the probabilities that he 
would choose Plan 0 or Plan 1 add to 99%, whereas the probability of high conservation 
effort (Plan 3) is zero. In scenario 1, only cost sharing is offered. This has the effect of 
decreasing the probability of no conservation effort (Plan 0) and increasing that of medium 
or high levels of effort (Plans 2 and 3). However, the probability that no effort or low effort 
is supplied remains high (the probabilities of Plan 0 and Plan 1 add to 77%). Scenario 2 
offers only compensation. Relative to the base scenario, the probability of no effort (Plan 0) 
decreases considerably, whereas the probability that low or medium conservation effort is 
forthcoming (Plans 1 and 2) increases. The probability of high effort (Plan 3) increases 
modestly, but remains small. In scenario 3, the landowner receives only assurances. The 
probability of no conservation effort (Plan 0) decreases to zero, whereas the probability of 
low or medium conservation effort is high (the probabilities of Plan 1 and Plan 2 add to 
98%). The probability of high conservation effort (Plan 3) increases slightly relative to the 
base scenario, but remains small.  
These scenarios suggest that, although all three types of incentives can have an 
effect on landowners’ decisions, cost sharing provides the weakest incentive, compensation 
has a somewhat stronger effect, and assurances is the most effective incentive. However, 
neither of these incentives, when used alone, is sufficient to significantly increase the 
probability that a high level of conservation effort (Plan 3) is provided.                    17
In scenarios 4 and 5 the financial incentives, cost sharing and compensation, are 
combined with assurances. In Scenario 4, a combination of cost sharing and assurances 
decreases the probability of no conservation effort (Plan 0) and increases the probability of 
low and medium effort (Plans 1 and 2) considerably more than the cost sharing incentive 
alone. Finally, in Scenario 5 a combination of compensation and assurances is offered. This 
combination would be the most effective in eliciting conservation effort, as the probability 
of Plan 3 (high effort) increases to 100%.  
These results suggest that the effectiveness of financial incentives can be increased 
by combining them with assurances. Adding assurances may increase the marginal effect of 
these incentives, making additional amounts of cost sharing or compensation payments 
more effective than they would be on their own. This can be seen in Figure 4, which shows 
the effects of increasing levels of compensation on the probabilities that each plan is 
implemented. In Figure 4a compensation is offered on its own, while in Figure 4b it is 
combined with assurances.  Although in Figure 4a the probability of Plan 0 decreases as 
compensation increases, Plan 0 remains the most likely alternative up to a compensation 
level of 70%. It would take full compensation (100%) for a representative landowner to 
implement Plan 1. The effect on the probabilities of Plan 2 or Plan 3 being implemented is 
small.  Figure 4b shows that increasing the level of compensation is considerably more 
effective when assurances are offered as well. Plan 3 is the most likely alternative at all 
levels of compensation, so compensation of 40% would be sufficient to elicit the highest 
level of conservation effort.  
  This analysis has focused on examining the effectiveness of various combinations 
of incentives in eliciting conservation effort from private landowners. Another important 
issue, which lies outside the scope of this paper, is the efficiency of the different incentive                 18
options from a social perspective. The various incentives may have different implications 
for social welfare, which are not addressed in the models presented here. For instance, 
funding compensation or cost sharing payments, conceivably through taxation, can generate 
a deadweight loss due to administrative costs and to distortions that could make these 
incentives less attractive. Providing assurances may also generate opportunity costs to 
society if the flexibility to correct management plans when conditions change in the future 
is curtailed. Thus, the most effective combinations of incentives, as evaluated here, may not 
necessarily be the most socially efficient.   
DISCUSSION 
  The results presented in the preceding sections suggest that the incentives examined 
in this paper could be effective in encouraging landowners to manage their property in a 
way that is beneficial to endangered species. Specifically, offering compensation and 
assurances incentives could increase the likelihood that landowners supply higher levels of 
conservation effort. On the other hand, cost sharing may not be as effective in eliciting 
conservation effort from landowners. One possible explanation for this result is that the 
landowners’ strong feelings about property rights, government intervention, and perceived 
unfairness of land use regulation may make compensation and assurances more relevant to 
them. Additionally, out-of-pocket costs may be small relative to the lost income and the 
perceived future impacts of regulation. 
  The coefficient for ASSIST is not statistically different from zero either. This 
indicates that offering technical assistance may not be effective in inducing landowners to 
supply higher levels of conservation effort. One possible explanation for this is that the 
landowners may be knowledgeable enough about managing their property to consider 
assistance unnecessary. On average, landowners rated the availability of technical                 19
assistance as only “somewhat important” in determining their management decisions. 
Additionally, comments made by landowners in the survey suggest some animosity towards 
the government and foresters or extension agents, often citing negative experiences in the 
past
8. Thus, landowners may want to keep the government out of their land, and may 
distrust foresters or extension agents.  
  The coefficient for the perceived likelihood of regulation (REGULATE) is not 
significant, implying that the “stick” of regulation may not be as effective as the incentive 
“carrots” in eliciting conservation effort from landowners. This may be because landowners 
do not seem to feel greatly threatened by the ESA: on average, they ranked the likelihood 
of regulation between “unlikely” and “even chance”, and 60% of them feel that there is no 
more than an even chance that the ESA will restrict activity on their property. Furthermore, 
landowners may view other regulations at the state or local level, such as the Oregon Plan 
for salmon or Washington’s Forest and Fish rules, as more immediate regulatory threats. 
This may explain why the results show that assurances are important to landowners, 
although they don’t consider ESA regulation likely.  
  Finally, the results of the simulation suggest that, although incentives like 
compensation and assurances may work on their own, a combination of incentives may be 
more effective in compelling landowners to manage their property for endangered species. 
In particular, better results can be achieved by combining financial incentives with 
assurances. In this specific case, the most effective combination would include 
compensation and assurances, since landowners would not be as responsive to the cost 
sharing incentive. Many landowners may not be opposed to providing habitat on their land, 
                                                 
8 For instance, landowners commented that they “want no part of any government agency because they lie, 
cheat, steal”, that there is “too much government in land now; they do a terrible job”, and that “the managing 
of private land should be left entirely to the landowner”.                 20
but hesitate to do so because they fear government intervention or question the fairness of 
having to assume the costs of providing a public good. The combination of compensation 
and assurances may be the most effective because it addresses these concerns by lowering 
the opportunity cost of managing for endangered species, and allowing landowners to keep 
control over land management decisions. 
  These results have interesting implications for conservation policy and the design of 
incentives programs. They suggest that the threat of regulation may not suffice to compel 
landowners to manage their property in a way that is beneficial to endangered species, in 
particular when landowners do not perceive that the threat of regulation is high. On the 
other hand, the use of incentives could be highly effective. Specifically, compensation for 
lost income and assurances about future regulation can play a significant role in eliciting 
conservation effort. Furthermore, combining financial incentives with assurances could 
have a larger positive effect on landowners than using either type of incentive on its own. 
Thus, conservation policy on private land might be improved by relying on a combination 
of incentives, including financial incentives and assurances, rather than exclusively on the 
threat of regulation. 
  An alternative option, of course, would be to make the threat of regulation more real 
by bolstering enforcement. This would conceivably increase the importance of assurances 
as an incentive. Landowners may not be willing to enter into agreements that include 
financial incentives but no assurances, since managing for endangered species given 
heightened enforcement would increase the risk of facing land use restrictions. On the other 
hand, an increased threat of regulation may make landowners more willing to enter into 
incentives programs that do include assurances. Thus, waving a heavier regulatory stick                 21
could be effective in encouraging landowners to manage for endangered species as long as 
the carrot of assurances is offered as well.  
This paper is a first step in evaluating the likely effectiveness of incentives 
programs. The framework used here could be applied to other incentives, such as tax 
breaks, different types of land, like wetlands or farmland, and different regions. This would 
further improve our understanding of the usefulness of these programs.  
APPENDIX 
16.  Suppose that you are presented with only the following choice. Compare  
       the four options and consider which one you would be most likely to choose.  
  Option 1    Option 2    Option 3    Option 4 
  - Thinning to 50-75 
   trees/acre, 
- 2-4 snags and  
  logs/acre, 




  - Thinning to 50-75 
   trees/acre, 
- 2-4 snags and  






  - Thinning to 50-75 





   




  You pay 75% 
of costs 
$ 
  You pay 50% 
of costs 
$ 
   







  You are  
compensated for  





  You are  
compensated for 
70% of  
lost income 
  None 
  You receive  
assurances 
  You receive  
assurances 




   






  No technical  
assistance 
  Technical  
assistance 
   
 I prefer …   OPTION                       OPTION                          OPTION                          OPTION  
 
(circle one)         1                                     2                                      3                                     4 
Please briefly describe the reason for your choice: _______________________________ 
 
_________________________________________________________________________________  
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FIGURE 4: SIMULATED CHOICE PROBABILITIES 
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TABLE 1: VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS AND SUMMARY STATISTICS 
Variable Description Mean Std.  Dev.
Incentives      
 SHARE
9  % of cost paid by landowner: 25, 50, 75, 100%  0.65  0.33 
 COMP  % of lost income compensated: 0, 40, 70, 100%  0.46  0.41 
 ASSURE  1 if assurances offered, 0 otherwise  0.51  0.18E-03 
 SHXIN  Interaction Variable = Share x Income  4.63  3.37 
 COXSTS  Interaction Variable = Comp x Stand size  11.10  21.11 
 COXSTA  Interaction variable = Comp x Stand age  16.05  26.75 
 ASXRE  Interaction Variable = Assure x Regulate  1.44  1.77 
 ASSIST  1 if tech. assistance offered, 0 otherwise  0.38  0.17E-03 
REGULATE  Perceived threat of regulation: Very Unlikely (1) 
to Very Likely (5) 
   
  2.82 
 
1.54 
Demographic      
 AGE  Age of landowner  58.10  13.22 
 EDUC1-4  Dummies: education level, elementary school (1) 
to graduate or professional school (6) 
  
 OCCUP  Occupation of landowner: 1 if related to logging, 





 INCOME1-6  Dummies: income level     
Property      
 ACRES  Total acres owned   135.79  437.89 
 WOODLAND  Total woodland acres owned   95.89  270.91 
 RESIDE  1 if residence on property, 0 otherwise   0.78      0.7E-04 
 YEARS  Number of years landowner has owned property  22.44      16.64 
Stand      
 STANDSIZE  Size of stand chosen for management (acres)  29.86  43.15 
 STANDAGE  Age of stand chosen for management  36.38  30.77 
 HARV20_40  1 if plans to harvest in 20 to 40 yrs., 0 otherwise   0.15  0.1E-03 
 HARV40  1 if plans to harvest in 40 or more yrs., 0 otherwise  0.19  0.1E-03 
 
                                                 
9 The levels of cost sharing offered by existing programs vary, but a common upper bound (e.g. the Wildlife 
Habitat Incentives Program or the Stewardship Incentive Program) is 75% (Environmental Defense Fund 
2000).                 25
TABLE 2: ORDERED PROBIT MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATES  
Variable    MODEL 1  MODEL 2   
Constant       -0.26      -0.27 
SHARE       -0.03      -0.04 
         (-0.50)     (-0.75) 
COMP         0.24***      0.25*** 
         (4.11)     (4.22) 
ASSURE        0.31***      0.33*** 
         (4.40)     (4.58) 
SHXIN        0.02**      0.02** 
         (2.25)     (2.40) 
COXSTS       -0.65E-03     -0.72E-03 
         (-1.02)     (-1.15) 
COXSTA       -0.74E-03     -0.74E-03 
         (-1.15)     (-1.18) 
ASXRE        0.82E-02      0.71E-02 
         (0.64)     (0.55) 
ASSIST        0.83E-03      0.01 
         (0.06)     (0.70) 
REGULATE       -0.56E-02     -0.55E-02 
         (-0.47)     (-0.46) 
AGE         -0.17E-03 
         (-0.24) 
EDUC2       -0.03 
       ( - 1 . 5 6 )  
EDUC3        0.67E-02 
         (0.37) 
EDUC4       -0.46E-02 
         (-0.22) 
OCCUP       -0.01 
         (-0.52) 
INCOME2        0.04       0.04 
          (1.27)     (1.29) 
INCOME3        0.05       0.05 
          (1.36)     (1.25) 
INCOME4        0.03       0.02 
          (0.55)     (0.36)                 26
Table 2 – Continued 
 
INCOME5       -0.02      -0.01       
         (-0.43)     (-0.24) 
INCOME6       -0.02      -0.04 
         (-0.38)     (-0.65) 
ACRES       0.13E-04      
         (0.41) 
WOODLAND      -0.24E-04        
         (-0.48) 
RESIDE       -0.30E-02        
         (-0.18) 
YEARS        0.30E-03       
         (0.53) 
STANDSIZE        0.17E-03      0.24E-03 
         (0.45)     (0.65) 
STANDAGE        0.35E-03      0.38E-03 
         (1.27)     (1.40) 
HARV20_40       -0.17E-02     -0.73E-02 
         (-0.09)     (-0.40) 
HARV40        0.04**      0.03** 
         (2.36)     (2.03) 
Log Likelihood     -622.10     -639.69 
χ
2 
a          692.92      696.21 
Scaled R
2 b        0.69       0.69 
 
Sample Size        724        739 
t-statistics in parenthesis 
*, **, *** indicate significance at α = 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01  
a Test statistic for H0: all parameters except the constant are zero  
b Scaled R
2 = 1 – (log Lu/ log Lr)
 – (2/N)log Lr, where Lu and Lr are the unrestricted and 
restricted (all parameters equal to zero) likelihood functions (Estrella 1998).                 27
TABLE 3: SIGNS OF MARGINAL EFFECTS FOR COMP AND ASSURE 
  ∆Pr(PLAN=0)  ∆Pr(PLAN=1)  ∆Pr(PLAN=2)  ∆Pr(PLAN=3)  
COMP            –                 –       +         + 
ASSURE          –       –      +         +  
 
 
TABLE 4: SIMULATED CHOICE PROBABILITIES 








Scenario 0:  No  Incentives  0.89 0.10 0.01 0.00 
Scenario 1:  Cost  Sharing 0.67 0.10 0.05 0.18 
Scenario 2:  Compensation  0.35 0.48 0.13 0.04 
Scenario 3:  Assurances  0.00 0.20 0.78 0.02 




























                 28
REFERENCES 
Bean, M. 1998. “The Endangered Species Act and Private Land: Four Lessons Learned 
from the Past Quarter Century”, Environmental Law Reporter 28. 
 
Bean, M. and D. Wilcove. 1996. “Ending the Impasse”, The Environmental Forum, 
July/August: 22-28. 
 
Bean, M. and D.Wilcove. 1997. “The Private Land Problem”, Conservation Biology 11:1-2. 
 
Bourland, T. and R. Stroup. 1996. “Rent Payments as Incentives: Making Endangered 
Species Welcome on Private Land”, Journal of Forestry 96: 18-21. 
 
Boyd, R. 1984. “Government Support of Nonindustrial Production: The Case of Private 
Forests”, Southern Economics Journal 51, July: 89-107. 
 
Cooper, J. C. and C. T. Osborn. 1998. “The Effect of Rental Rates on the Extension of 
Conservation Reserve Program Contracts”, American Journal of Agricultural Economics 
80(1): 184-195. 
 
Defenders of Wildlife. 1994. Building Economic Incentives into the Endangered Species 
Act, 3
rd ed. Washington, D.C.: Defenders of Wildlife.  
 
Dillman, D. A. 1978. Mail and Telephone Surveys. The Total Design Method. New York: 
John Wiley & Sons. 
 
Edwards, S.F. and G. D. Anderson. 1987. “Overlooked Biases in Contingent Valuation 
Surveys: Some Considerations”, Land Economics 63(2): 168-178. 
 
Environmental Defense Fund. Conservation Incentives. Helping Landowners Help 
Endangered Species. www.environmentaldefense.org.Visited August 22, 2000. 
 
Estrella, A. 1998. “A New Measure of Fit for Equations With Dichotomous Dependent 
Variables”, Journal of Business & Economic Statistics 16(2): 198-205. 
 
Greene, W. H. 2000. Econometric Analysis. 4
th Ed. Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall. 
 
Hardie, I. and P. Parks. 1996. “Program Enrollment and Acreage Response to Reforestation 
Cost-Sharing Programs”, Land Economics 72(2): 248-260. 
 
Hayes, J. P., S. S. Chan, W. H. Emmingham, J. C. Tappeiner, L. D. Kellog, and J. D. 
Bailey. 1997 “Wildlife Response to Thinning Young Forests in the Pacific Northwest”, 
Journal of Forestry, August 1997: 28-33.  
 
Heckman, J.J. 1979. “Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error”, Econometrica 47: 
153-161. 
                 29
Innes, R. 2000. “The Economics of Takings and Compensation When Land and Its Public 
Use Value Are in Private Hands”, Land Economics 76(2): 195-212.  
 
Kennedy, E., R. Costa, and W. Smathers Jr. 1996. “Economic Incentives: New Directions 
for Red-Cockaded Woodpecker Habitat Conservation”, Journal of Forestry 96: 22-26. 
 
Keystone Center, The. 1995. Dialogue on Incentives to Protect Endangered Species on 
Private Lands: Final Report. Keystone, Colorado. 
 
Kline, J., Alig, R., and R. Johnson. 2000. “Forest Owner Incentives to Protect Riparian 
Habitat”, Ecological Economics 33(1): 29-43.  
 
Kluender, R. A., T. L. Walkingstick, and J. C. Pickett. 1999. “The Use of Forestry 
Incentives by Nonindustrial Forest Landowner Groups: Is It Time for a Reassessment of 
Where We Spend Our Tax Dollars?”, Natural Resources Journal 39: 799-818. 
 
Langpap, C. and J. Wu. 2002. “Voluntary Conservation of Endangered Species: When 
Does ‘No Surprises’ Mean No Conservation?”, Working paper, Dept. of Ag. and Resource 
Economics, Oregon State University.  
 
Long, J. S. 1997. Regression Models for Categorical and Limited Dependent Variables. 
Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. 
 
Mann, C. and M. Plummer. 1995. Noah’s Choice. The Future of Endangered Species. New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf. 
 
McLean-Meyinsse, P. E., J. Hui, and R. Joseph, Jr. 1994. “An Empirical Analysis of 
Louisiana Small Farmers’ Involvement in the Conservation Reserve Program”, Journal of 
Agricultural and Applied Economics 26(2): 379-385. 
 
Messonier, M. L., J. C. Bergstrom, C. M. Cornwell, R. J. Teasley, and H. K. Cordell. 2000. 
“Survey Response-Related Biases in Contingent valuation: Concepts, Remedies, and 
Empirical Application to Valuing Aquatic Plant Management”, American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics 83: 438-450. 
 
Michael, J. and D. Lueck. 2000. “Preemptive Habitat Destruction Under the Endangered 
Species Act: The Case of the Red-Cockaded Woodpecker”. Working Paper, Montana State 
University. 
 
Mitchell, R. C. and R. T. Carson. 1989. Using Surveys to Value Public Goods: The 
Contingent Valuation Method. Washington, DC: Resources for the Future.  
 
Polasky, S. 2001. “Investment, Information Collection, and Endangered Species 
Conservation on Private Land”, in J. Shogren and J. Tschirhart (Eds.), Protecting 
Endangered Species in the United States: Biological Needs, Political Realities, and 
Economic Choices. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
                 30
Polasky, S. and H. Doremus. 1998. “When the Truth Hurts: Endangered Species Policy on 
Private Land with Imperfect Information”, Journal of Environmental Economics and 
Management 35: 22-47. 
 
Royer, J.P. 1987. “Determinants of Reforestation Behavior Among Southern Landowners”, 
Forest Science 33 (3): 654-667. 
 
Smith, R. B. W. 1995. “The Conservation reserve Program as a Least-Cost Land 
Retirement Mechanism”, American Journal of Agricultural Economics 77(1): 93-105. 
 
Smith, R. B. W. and J. F. Shogren. 2001. “Protecting Species on Private Land”, in J. 
Shogren and J. Tschirhart (Eds.), Protecting Endangered Species in the United States: 
Biological Needs, Political Realities, and Economic Choices, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Smith, R. B. W. and J. F. Shogren. 2002. “Voluntary Incentive Design for Endangered 
Species Protection”, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 43: 169-187. 
 
Stone, R. 1995. “Incentives Offer Hope for Habitat”, Science 269: 1212-1213. 
 
U. S. Department of Agriculture. 1993. Forest Ecosystem Management: An Ecological, 
Economic, and Social Assessment. Report of the Forest Ecosystem Management 
Assessment Team. 
 
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. 1992. Recovery Plan for the Northern Spotted Owl – Draft. 
Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office. 
 
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. 1997a. News release, June 6, 1997. 
U. S. Fish and Wildlife Service. 1997b. Recovery Plan for the Threatened Marbled 
Murrelet in Washington, Oregon, and California. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office.  
 
Vickerman, S. 1998. Stewardship Incentives. Conservation Strategies for Oregon’s 
Working Landscape. Washington, DC: Defenders of Wildlife. 
 
Wilcove, D., M. Bean, R. Bonnie, and M. McMillan. 1996. “Rebuilding the Ark: Toward a 
More Effective Endangered Species Act for Private Land”, www.edf.org. Environmental 
Defense Fund. 
Wu, J. and B. Babcock. 1996. “Contract Design and the Purchase of Environmental Goods 
from Agriculture”, American Journal of Agricultural Economics 78(4): 935-945. 
Zhang, D. and W. A. Flick. 2001. “Stick, Carrots, and Reforestation Investment”, Land 
Economics 77(3): 443-456. 
 